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AGENT'S REPUTATION, ACCOUNTING
AND COSTING IN ORGANISATIONAL
CONTROL STRUCTURES
Abstract: This paper examines the roles of accounting and costing in
the management of coal mining during the Industrial Revolution in
Britain, and considers the impact of the agent's reputation in the
development and use of these systems.

INTRODUCTION
This paper deals with the accounting and costing systems
employed during the British Industrial Revolution at Tanfield
Moor Colliery in North East England. The paper has three objectives: (1), to add to the body of research [Edwards, 1989;
Fleischman and Parker, 1991] that questions the view of Pollard
[1965, p.248] that "the practice of using accounts as direct aids
to management was not one of the achievements of the British
Industrial Revolution"; (2), to challenge the expectation of
Fleischman and Parker [p.363] that "nascent cost accounting
would flourish more notably in a factory environment" than in
extractive industries; and (3), to examine the use of accounting
and costing information by an absentee owner and his agent,
and in doing so, to provide some reflections on principal-agent
relationships and organisational control. The paper is organised
into three main sections. In the first section, the context is set
by means of a review of the relevant literature of the coal industry. In the second section, aspects of agency theory are outlined
and a detailed examination is undertaken of the accounting and
costing systems employed in the particular context of Tanfield
Moor Colliery. Finally, the implications of the current research
are considered.
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THE CONTEXT
The "Bibliography of the British Coal Industry" [Benson,
1981] indicates a vast literature on the British Coal Industry.
However, in setting the context for the current paper, the
present author has noted the caveat expressed in the definitive
series "The History of the British Coal Industry": coal was a
regional industry rather than a national one. Although this caveat was expressed [Hatcher, 1993, p.vi) in relation to the period up to 1700, "intense regional diversity" [Church, 1986, p.2]
continued to characterise the industry throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Thus the contextual analysis of
the current paper is based on North East England in particular,
and factors relating to other regional or to national circumstances are drawn into the analysis only if they are directly
relevant.
The North East of England is made up of two counties,
Northumberland and Durham, and has three major rivers that
lead to the sea: the rivers Tyne, Wear and Tees. Access to the
sea was crucial to the development of the N o r t h East as
Britain's premier coal mining region. Coal is an extremely bulky
and heavy commodity in relation to its market value, making its
overland transport difficult and costly. Water transport was the
only cost-effective means of transporting coal over long distances: in 1675 Sir Robert Southwell considered that transporting coal from Newcastle Upon Tyne to London by an overland
route was sixty times more expensive than by the sea route
[Hatcher, 1993, p. 13]. The North East was unique in having
ample coal deposits, access to the sea and being within striking
distance of the key market of London. Thus the North East was
well placed to respond when the demand for coal grew in the
London market under the pressures of rising population, increasing industrialisation and the depletion of timber-fuel reserves. Although precise output figures are a matter of great
debate there is a consensus [e.g. Blake, 1967; Hatcher, 1993;
Nef, 1932], that the late sixteenth century marked the first great
expansion of the region's coal industry. Output rose from
90,000 tons in 1560, c. 40 per cent of national output, to
1,250,000 t o n s in 1700, c.47 p e r cent of n a t i o n a l o u t p u t
[Hatcher, 1993, p.68], to about 3 million tons in 1775, c.34 per
cent of national output, and to about 7 million tons in 1830,
c.23 per cent of national output. This reduction in national
d o m i n a n c e took place as industrial d e m a n d for coal grew
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol24/iss1/2
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throughout the country and facilitated supply by other coal
fields.
Between 1805-1830, the North-East coal trade was dominated by the Joint Durham and Northumberland Coal Owners
Association [Flinn, 1984, p.256]. The major function of the joint
association was to enhance colliery profits by restricting output
and eliminating price competition. The total "vend" or sale of
coal was fixed by a central committee that allocated quotas to
collieries on a fortnightly or monthly basis, levying heavy fines
for excess output. At times, as in periods during 1818-19, 1820,
1822, 1826 and 1829, failure to agree the sub-division of the
vend between collieries led to open trade [ibid., p.263]. The
regulation of sales referred only to "sea-sale" coal, that is to
coal transported by sea r a t h e r t h a n by land. However the
North-East's principal markets were "sea-sale" being mainly
along the east coast and in London. In supplying these markets
the North-East coal field produced about 3 million tons of coal
in 1775, c.34 per cent of national output, and about 7 million
tons of coal in 1830, c. 23 per cent of national output, However
in 1830 the North-East "was still the acknowledged leader in
technology, in the skill of its miners, and in the expertise of its
managers" [ibid., p.28]. Members of the senior managerial class
were known as "viewers", a term derived from the verb "to
view", that is to survey, a colliery. In the North-East the term
viewer was applied to colliery managers, in the paid employment of the owners, and also to independent professional experts who provided their services on a freelance basis. Essentially, the task of an employed manager was to r u n the day-to
day operations of the colliery, whilst the independent professional "advised and directed larger issues of colliery design,
construction and development" [ibid., p.58]. Professional viewers "were a mixture of manager, engineer, surveyor, accountant
and agent" [ibid., p.59] and attracted their own "schools" of
assistants and apprentices. There were three great schools in
the North-East at the beginning of the nineteenth century:
those of Buddie, Barnes and Johnson. Buddie was "the doyen"
[Burgess, 1986, p. 15], being viewer, agent, consultant and partowner in many of the region's leading collieries. Furthermore,
from 1806-1831 Buddie was secretary to the Tyne Committee of
the Joint Association and at times represented very powerful
interests on the Wear Committee. Although the constitution of
the Joint Association
Published by eGrove, 1997
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allowed for democratic m a n a g e m e n t , the extent to
which it could be dominated by one m a n should not be
underestimated....(Given) his immense reputation....(it)
must have (been) very difficult to offer serious opposition to Buddie on either c o m m i t t e e [Flinn, 1984,
pp.261-2]
It is clear that Buddie was the dominant coal-mining professional of his era, and, in the midst of heavy, wide-ranging
professional responsibilities, he chose to act as viewer and
manager at only two collieries: at the mighty Wallsend Colliery
and at the relatively minor Tanfield Moor Colliery [ibid., p.59].
Whereas Wallsend Colliery was owned by residents of the
North-East who at times inter-linked ownership of Wallsend
with partnerships in other collieries, Tanfield Moor was owned
throughout Buddie's management by a single individual, William Morton Pitt, who lived far away in the South-West of England. Thus, the archives relating to Tanfield Moor Colliery,
housed at the Northumberland Record Office (NRO) and the
Durham Record Office (DRO), provide a unique opportunity to
analyse the roles of accounting and costing in the context of
Buddie's management and in the context of the principal-agent
relationship of Pitt, the absentee owner, and Buddie, the on-site
manager.
ACCOUNTING AND COSTING AT
TANFIELD MOOR COLLIERY
Introduction
Based on a detailed study of the coal-mining industry of the
British Industrial Revolution, Fleischman and Parker [forthcoming] are set to overturn their previous expectation [1991,
p.363] that "nascent cost accounting would flourish more notably in factory environment" than in extractive industries. Following particular searches in the archives of the North-East
England coal industry, their forthcoming study will help to
bring to a wider audience the wealth of this specific element of
Britain's cost accounting heritage. Until now, this heritage has
not been subject to great scrutiny by accounting historians but
has long been used as a basis for studies by economic historians [e.g. Ashton and Sykes, 1964]. Recently Hatcher [1993] has
noted that accounting and costing have long been of great importance in the British coal industry in general and that of the
North-East in particular. Having examined the archive evidence
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol24/iss1/2
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Hatcher stated [p.305] that, prior to 1700, colliery accounts,
whatever their deficiencies, were "among the most advanced of
all forms of contemporary business accounts" and conclude
[p.306] that
few colliery accounts did not permit output, sales,
costs and revenues to be calculated and mapped
(and) information extracted from accounts could provide a serviceable basis for weighing the prospects of
future ventures. Of the higher order data, cash flow
was also normally discernible, and so too was the balance between output and sales, the average cost of producing each unit of coal, and the average profit from
its sale. B o o k k e e p i n g as p r a c t i s e d by very m a n y
collieries, in all its eccentricity and lush profusion of
styles, was a serviceable tool of management
The Hatcher study is a work of a economic and social history
that provides valuable early surveys of accounting and costing
that indicate that these disciplines were well established in the
British coal-mining industry prior to the Industrial Revolution.
Thus the current work on accounting and costing in Tanfield
Moor Colliery during the Industrial Revolution is set in the
context of a developed and widely employed knowledge base.
However by focusing on one specific colliery the current work
can provide a wealth of a detailed evidence to add to the rather
more generalised picture built up by the extant economic histories.
Tanfield Moor Colliery
The Pitt family, who lived in the South-West of England,
claimed to have purchased Tanfield Moor Colliery in 1690
[NRO Bud/22, p. 150]. The Pitts were absentee owners, who relied upon others to manage the colliery for them. It is probable
that in the late 1700s the colliery was managed on behalf of the
Pitts by a family of local viewers, the Browns, who had conducted a "view" of Tanfield Moor in 1764 [NRO, WAT 2/5,
p.32]. In the Browns' "View Book" [NRO, WAT 2/5] there is a
run of fortnightly reports for Tanfield Moor, dating from December 1776 - July 1778. Essentially these reports consisted of
a listing of payments and a physical reconciliation of stocks,
production and sales, and were prepared for "the use of John
Pitt Esq.", the absentee owner of the colliery. The reports enable current researchers to gain some indication of the operaPublished by eGrove, 1997
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tion of the colliery. The reports indicate that while the colliery
was owned by Pitt and its viewers were the Browns, the mining
of coal was undertaken by two contractors, James and William
King, this form of mining organisation being widespread in the
North-East between 1780 and 1815 [Taylor, 1960]. The colliery
was the overall unit of organisation, and contained two different pits, "the Willey pitt" and "the Brook pitt". As was common
practice, over time individual pits were worked out and new
pits opened within the continuing operations of the colliery.
From the pit, the coal was transported to the staithes, or loading points, on the River Tyne whence it was shipped down river
on keel boats and transferred at sea to colliers which sailed
down the East coast to sell the coal mainly at the London markets. In a draft pro-forma report of the 1790s [NRO Bud/22,
pp.44-45], the system for reporting physical flows of coal was
reformulated and a model "general" account developed to
record transactions with the "fitter" (sales agent) and for cash.
However, there is no evidence of either of these systems being
used in practice. Nevertheless, the model general account does
contain information on cash balances, receipts, payments and
remittances to the owner that would probably have been of
great value to an absentee owner.
As an absentee owner, Pitt was particularly reliant upon his
on-site managers. Much of Pitt's period of ownership was dominated by two on-site managers, Nathaniel Clayton, Agent from
1800-1822 and John Buddie, who was Pitt's Agent from 18221836. Since the relationship between Pitt, on the one hand, and
Clayton and Buddie, on the other, are clearly relationships between a principal and his agents, relevant elements of the
agency literature are now reviewed in order to provide additional context prior to the detailed examination of Tanfield
Moor's accounting and costing archive. Jensen and Meckling
[1976, p.308] define an agency relationship as a contract under
which the principal engages the agent to undertake work on his
behalf whilst delegating some authority for decision making to
the agent. They note that, at times, the agent may act to further
his own interest rather than that of the principal, and that the
principal can act to limit such tendencies by offering appropriate incentives to the agent and by using monitoring systems
designed to limit deviant activities by the agent. The agent may
incur bonding costs to guarantee that he will not undertake
certain actions which would harm the principal or to ensure
that the principal would be compensated for any such actions.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol24/iss1/2
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However despite incentives, monitoring and bonding, the principal may suffer "residual loss" because of divergence between
the agent's decisions and the decisions that would maximise the
welfare of the principal.
P r i n c i p a l - a g e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p s w e r e at t h e core of the
"Memorandum of Agreement" [NRO Bud/22, pp.37-40] m a d e in
1800 when William Morton Pitt appointed Nathaniel Clayton of
Newcastle as "his agent for the Management of his Colliery
called Tanfield Moor...and his....Agent for selling the Coals
thereof." Under the terms of the agreement, Clayton was to:
• execute a bond of £5,000 to Pitt as a safeguard for his
fulfilling the terms of the agreement;
• keep "truly and faithfully" accounts of all his receipts
and payments and render such accounts to Pitt or his
representatives whenever required;
• remit to Pitt or his representative any surplus cash not
required to cover current expenditures, together with the
relevant cash account;
• present fortnightly reports of expenditures and physical
flows of coal; and
• present yearly cash accounts, within one m o n t h of the
year-end, and pay any surplus cash balance to Pitt.
In return, as his part of the agreement, Pitt was to:
• pay Clayton £562 per a n n u m to cover selling expenses;
• cover all colliery expenses, except those connected with
selling; and
• pay Clayton for his services by means of a fixed sum of
£400 per a n n u m plus a further £12 "for every One Hundred Pounds remitted...as profits....over and above the
Clear Annual Sum of Three Thousand Three Hundred
and Thirty Three Pounds, Six Shillings and Eight Pence.
Under the agreement, Clayton was to have control over all
personnel, but the books of account were deemed to be Pitt's
property to be passed to him or his representatives on demand,
although Clayton was free to make copies. Thus the Memorand u m of Agreement was a clear contract between principal and
agent and it indicated that the accounting system was the key
to the way in which Pitt, as principal, sought to protect his
interests. The M e m o r a n d u m indicates Pitt's intention to use the
accounting system as a means of obtaining information on the
colliery and its cash flows, and as a means of providing appropriate incentives to his agent. Unfortunately gaps in the archive
prevent an analysis of how this principal-agent relationship acPublished by eGrove, 1997
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tually worked in practice. However, this arrangement continued
until 1822 when concerns over the financial performance of the
colliery and Clayton's effectiveness as Agent prompted Pitt to
engage the services of John Buddie.
John Buddie
It is apparent that Buddie was aware of the moral hazards
involved in principal-agent relationships and that he had clear
views on setting incentives for agents. In 1813 he reported
[NRO Bud/6, pp.61-2] to the owners of Water-house Colliery in
Lancashire on profits that had failed to meet expectations:
My surprise (at the low profits) subsided in a great
measure, on being informed that the managers of some
of the principal Collieries were allowed a premium on
the number of Tons sold Yearly - not on the Profits....I
don't wonder that the Price of Coals has been reduced
from time to time, nor that it should still continue to
be reduced, until such an absurd practice is abolished.
Under this System, the interest of the Colliery proprietors and that of his Agent are completely at variance,
and it is too much to expect of human nature that the
Agent is to sacrifice his own interest to that of the
employer. If an Agent is to be allowed any extra remuneration, at all, over and above his Yearly Salary, it
ought surely to be on the Profits made not the quantity
sold.
The Tanfield Moor archive does not reveal any arranged or
actual incentive payments to Buddie, and, apart from a "simple
Money Bond" [NRO Bud/22, p.91] of £4,000 made by Buddie on
taking up his post, does not contain any formal agreement
made between Pitt and Buddie for the regulation of their relationship. Whether or not such an agreement ever existed, Pitt
probably counted himself fortunate that Buddie agreed to accept this commission, given Buddie's pre-eminence in the coal
industry. In Buddie, Pitt had obtained an agent of the very
highest reputation. The impact of reputation in principal-agent
relationships has not yet been subject to a great deal of scrutiny, but does have "potential implications for managerial accounting research" [Baiman, 1990, p.357]. Baiman argues that
relationships between "reputable" individuals have distinct benefits over those between individuals without such reputations,
including the reduction of the costs of drawing up contracts
and collecting information, as well as by "increasing the set of
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol24/iss1/2
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supportable actions." In a "reputable" relationship, the agent
will be careful to maintain his reputation, since, inter alia, it
affects his future earning power in other relationships, and the
principal will act fairly as this helps him to secure the services
of an agent with a reputation for profitable management and
integrity. The acquisition of an agent of Buddie's reputation
must be seen in the context of an industry where fraud and
corruption were rampant. Reviewing the period up to 1700,
Hatcher [1993, p.304] noted that major determinants of colliery
profits were not only the owner's ability to track output and
cash and to impose efficiency, but also his ability to limit fraud:
the "control of fraud undoubtedly absorbed a disproportionate
a m o u n t of
energy and ingenuity." This concern continued to
be a major pre-occupation in the coal industry throughout the
period of the current study, and, in a letter to Buddie in 1824,
Pitt [DRO NCB l/JB/1090] referred to two recently published
treatises on the "abuses", "impositions and frauds" practised in
the coal trade, and commented that "both (authors) assert, that
more deception and cheating is practised on Tanfield Moor
Coal in London than on any other." However, it is apparent that
Buddie's reputation caused Pitt to place a great deal of faith
and trust in him, and to delegate wide decision-making powers
to him. In the matter of negotiations with Clayton over "fitting"
fees, Pitt [ibid/10880] wrote to Buddie in February 1824, "I
h o p e y o u will gain y o u r e n d in t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h
Mr.Clayton, pray let there be no reference to me, - you have
carte blanche." Although, in May 1824, Pitt [ibid/1089] did suggest that Buddie should reach a compromise with Clayton, this
was one of the very few occasions when he made a direct contribution to the management of Tanfield Moor affairs. Virtually
the whole of Pitt's correspondence to Buddie [DRO/NCB/JB/
1088-1133] consists of requests for the remittance of funds and
with Pitt's own personal financial situation. Pitt showed almost
no interest in the operation of Tanfield Moor as a colliery or as
a business venture; essentially he was interested only in the
cash flow he could generate from Tanfield Moor. In practice,
Pitt delegated full decision-making authority to Buddie; as he
wrote [ibid, p. 1127] in 1830 in response to a minor management recommendation made to him by Buddie, "Any recommendation of yours has a claim to adoption on our part."
Just as Pitt was prepared to delegate to Buddie, so Buddie
was prepared to take the initiative in his dealings with Pitt.
Whereas Pitt had imposed reporting and financial arrangePublished by eGrove, 1997
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ments on Clayton, Buddie [NRO Bud/22. p.86] took the initiative in setting out the arrangements that he considered satisfactory,
I have
found from experience that the more my employers know of their own affairs and my m a n n e r of
acting in them, the more comfortable and satisfactory
it is to myself. I a m therefore desirous in undertaking
the trust, which you have so kindly reposed in me, to
establish a system of m a n a g e m e n t , a n d correspondence, which may keep you in regular communication
with your affairs in this quarter - not to teaze you with
trifling matters but to give you sufficient information
on all material points.
In his review and analysis of the agency literature, Baiman
[1990, p.363] addresses the question as to why the principal
would ever find it in his best interests to delegate the choice of
monitoring system to the agent. However, there is no evidence
that, at Tanfield Moor, Pitt used the accounting and costing
systems to monitor Buddie. The word "trust" appears to be a
highly significant word in the context of this particular principal-agent relationship and the trust engendered by Buddie's
reputation is an important theme running throughout the current research. Thus both parties felt secure enough to allow the
agent, rather t h a n the principal, to implement not only accounting arrangements but also banking procedures. At the outset, Buddie gave Pitt details of the banking arrangements he
proposed to make and set out his plans to prepare a bank account for Pitt every 28 days, noting that the monthly cash flow
would also provide "a tolerably accurate criterion of the actual
profit of the colliery" [ibid, p.87]. Buddie set up this system of
accounts [NRO, Bud 37/1-6] and, every 28 days, provided Pitt
with accounts detailing transactions and balances with the
coal-fitter and with the bank. Additionally, Pitt was provided
with a statement showing period and cumulative sales to the
coal-fitter, in physical and financial terms, a summary abstract
of the bank account and a detailed abstract of cash payments in
the period. Thus Buddie himself designed and operated the accounting system he used in reporting to Pitt. However, from
Pitt's viewpoint, useful checks were built into the system.
Transactions with the bank and with the coal-fitter could, if
required, be checked easily and independently of Buddie and at
frequent, regular intervals. Although Buddie's monthly accounting system was not particularly innovative, as it simply built
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol24/iss1/2
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upon and extended Tanfield Moor's existing systems, it did provide the absentee owner with information relevant to obtaining
an overview of the business and its financial position, as well as
checking u p on his agent, although there is no evidence that
Pitt ever used the information in these ways.
It is apparent that Buddie was highly trusted, for in 1823
Pitt agreed to Buddie's tactfully worded suggestion [NRO Bud/
22, p. 174] regarding the format and preparation of annual accounts:
It occurs to m e that as good a Plan as any of choosing
the Colliery Accts for the.... year will be to make out a
Cash Account folio, a journal (and) a profit and loss
Acc t . The former will show the Cash Balance at the end
of the year, and the latter by giving credit for all debts
due, and charging all debts owing, will give a correct
view of the Year's Profit....I shall however be very glad
to adopt any other mode or form that you may prefer
and shall feel obliged by any suggestion.... you (make)
on this subject. Simplicity and clearness is what we
ought to aim at, and by a little attention I hope we
shall succeed...and in looking forward to the making
u p of the Yearly Book it has occurred to me that Mr
Watson would be as proper a person as any other.
Given that Buddie was responsible not only for the design
of the annual accounting system, but also for the choice of the
accountant who would undertake the preparation of accounts,
Pitt appeared to repose a great deal of trust and confidence in
him. The information supplied to Pitt in accounting form was
supplemented by that contained in letters written to him by
Buddie [NRO Bud/22]. The correspondence is voluminous and
is biased in quantity, perhaps not unnaturally, towards the
early years of the principal-agent relationship. However, the
letter book is probably incomplete in that Buddie acknowledged
to Pitt in 1824 that "I very seldom have an opportunity of keeping copies of my letters to you" [ibid, p. 186]. Despite the fact
that Buddie had established the system of reporting to Pitt by
accounts and by letters, it is apparent that he did not feel constrained by it. It appears that although the accounts were always prepared and sent to Pitt, at times the letter-writing was
limited, as Buddie noted to Pitt in 1827 [ibid, p.234]:
It is now so long since you received a letter from me,
that I a m afraid you will begin to think me an idle
fellow. The fact however is that I a m more remiss in
Published by eGrove, 1997
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writing than in acting - when I cannot manage both,
the former "goes to the wall" and the latter has my
exclusive attention.
Thus the letter-writing system was not a rigid requirement
imposed on the agent by the principal, but a. method of reporting that the agent used at his discretion. Although the letter
book is probably incomplete, it is possible to gain from it an
understanding of Buddie's concerns in the m a n a g e m e n t of
Tanfield Moor. There were four major areas of importance: production, sales, transport and financial management. The curr e n t r e s e a r c h examines each of these a r e a s a n d assesses
Buddie's use of costing and accounting information in dealing
with them.
Production: In the late eighteenth century coal was extracted from Tanfield Moor by contractors. Although it cannot
be dated precisely because of lack of archival evidence, this
form of mining organisation was ended at Tanfield Moor by
1822 [NRO, Bud 37/1]. Generally the practice had died out in
the North-East by 1815, largely due to contractors' tendencies
to exploit pits for their own short-term gains rather t h a n the
long-term benefit of owners [Taylor, 1960]. Thus Buddie was
r e s p o n s i b l e for t h e d i r e c t m a n a g e m e n t of t h e c o l l i e r y
workforce. Despite the fact that production was naturally of
considerable importance at any colliery, Buddie spent remarkably little time reporting on it to Pitt, probably because it was a
relatively problem-free area of colliery operations. In 1825,
Buddie [NRO, Bud/22, p. 190] wrote to Pitt noting "I a m happy
to say that the state of the colliery underground is highly satisfactory" and in 1827 [ibid, p.231] he commented that, as regards production, "we are going on very well." Although the
preparation of production cost analyses was a well-established
practice in the North-East England coal mining industry, and
such costings existed at Tanfield Moor as early as 1749 [NRO,
Bud/25,p.31], Buddie devoted little costing effort to this area.
Such costing was "extremely complicated" [Flinn, 1984, p.286]
and Buddle may have decided not to undertake it, given his
expert judgement of the satisfactory state of production matters
and the very limited amount of time he could spend on Tanfield
Moor's affairs. Buddie's satisfaction with mining operations
may have been based not only on the expertise with which he
directed them, but also by the way in which they were carried
out by miners he selected and hired at the annual "binding".
The management of labour relations in the coal mining indushttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol24/iss1/2
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try of North-East England was an extremely difficult task. At
times bindings and pay negotiations involved miners in strikes,
lawlessness, carrying guns, physical violence and killings; coal
owners backed their negotiations with the draconian penalties
of the established legal system and the use of the militia [Jones,
1986]. Buddie was a key figure in the industry and, as a negotiator for the coal owners was an obvious target for the wrath of
the mine-workers. However, he also inspired the respect and
admiration of the workers. At times this proved rather overwhelming, as in 1831 when he helped in the successful resolution of a bitter pay dispute and the workers wanted to carry
him shoulder-high in procession from his home in Wallsend to
Newcastle the regional capital five miles away [Colls, 1987,
p.92]. Buddie won the respect of the "pitmen" not simply because of his managerial abilities, but for his attitude towards
them and their work. He attached importance to the skills and
qualities required of a "pitman" and maintained a strong commitment to pit work. Although the region's other leading viewers no longer went underground in pursuit of their duties,
Buddie continued to do so and after major accidents insisted
upon being among the first to go down the pit to review the
s i t u a t i o n . T h u s a l t h o u g h B u d d i e ' s p r o d u c t i o n c o s t i n g at
Tanfield Moor was somewhat limited, it is probable that he
more than compensated for this by the way in which he undertook the direct management of the labour force.
Sales ("the vend"): Between 1805-1830, the Joint D u r h a m
and Northumberland Coal Owners Association regulated "the
vend" or sale of coal by fixing prices and establishing quotas for
each colliery. In order to get their coal to market, the owners
hired independent shipping agents, known as "fitters", w h o
owned keels that transported the coal from the staithes down
the River Tyne to waiting colliers. The fitter engaged the master
of the colliery to carry the coal to market,' often down the East
coast to London. At times competition between coal-dwners
caused the system of regulation to break down, and open or
"fighting" trade ensued. During these periods of open trade the
formal regulation was replaced by a m o r e flexible system
known as "freighting" which entailed the shipment of coals to
market and sale at whatever price could be obtained. The vend
was all-important to Tanfield Moor's success. As Buddie noted
[NRO, Bud/22, p. 191] since underground affairs were highly
satisfactory, "our prosperity ... will depend entirely upon the
extent of our vend." However, Buddie was faced with fundaPublished by eGrove, 1997
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mental problems in this sphere of his management as there was
a limited demand for the type of coal mined at Tanfield Moor
for, while m u c h of the success of the North-East coal industry
was based on high quality household coal, Tanfield Moor produced soft coal used by specialist manufacturers. This demand
was limited at the best of times and even more so during
recessionary periods such as those which saw the colliery's
sales fall from approximately 17,000 chaldrons in 1831 to just
over 13,000 chaldrons in 1833, a chaldron weighing approximately 6,000 pounds [Hiskey, 1978, p.73]. In these circumstances, Buddie was forced to use "freighting" as a means of
maintaining sales. However when prices fell to particularly low
levels Buddie [NRO, Bud/22, p.333] reported to Pitt that "to
have pushed the vend under such circumstances would have
been absolutely ruinous. I was glad therefore to work no more
coals than barely necessary to occupy the establishment and
allow the workmen a maintenance." Buddie did not refer to any
financial analysis to support this decision and the archives do
not contain any such explicit assessments. However, the regulation of the vend had a dramatic impact on selling prices. In
1834, freighting prices were 15s 3½d per chaldron, but, after
the restoration of the regulation of the vend rose to 20s per
chaldron. Nevertheless, Buddie did have the ability to influence
sales price and volume by his management of the marketing
system. For example, in 1835 he decided to consign all of
Tanfield Moor's coals to one London factor rather than to several, and, as a result of the concentration of business and the
greater care and attention given to Tanfield Moor by this single
factor, the coals began to sell at their full nominal price of 24s
per chaldron, although Buddie still had to exercise discretion
over the quantity of coal to send to the market [Hiskey, 1978,
p.74]. Although the fortnightly r e p o r t s m a y have e n a b l e d
Buddie to keep very close track of vends and prices, there is
little extant evidence to suggest that he employed more detailed
ad hoc revenue-cost analysis in his sales management. Nevertheless, Buddie was capable of using cost data when he thought
it necessary; for example in his negotiations with Clayton regarding the latter's "fitting" fees, he reported [ibid, p. 123] to
Pitt:
I took my particulars of my Estimate of the Cost of the
Fitting Establishment; and wished Mr Clayton to discuss it item by item; but he was not sufficiently with
the minutiae of the business, to enable h i m to do
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol24/iss1/2
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so....if he can satisfy himself that my estimate is correct, he will be satisfied with it.
However, underlying all the spheres of sales revenue and
cost management lay the issue of corruption. The entire process
of the coal industry, from mining through to distribution and
marketing, created potential for abuse by agents. Some agents'
"perquisites" were accepted throughout the industry: for example viewers supplied owners with corving rods, used to make
baskets for hauling coal underground, and in doing so made a
profit for themselves. Buddie noted, perhaps somewhat coyly,
that the costs of corving rods was "one of the secrets and mysteries of the profession" [quoted in Flinn, 1984, p.62]. However,
although this benefit may have been viewed as legitimate, others were more suspect. When coal was sold in the London market, it went through a complex handling and marketing system
that "creaked with corruption" [ibid, p.279] and systems nearer
home were equally unsatisfactory. Buddie believed that fitting
agents' clerks encouraged the use of freighting in order to obtain substantial corrupt payments from shipmasters whose
colliers would otherwise have been idle. He considered freighting to be "a woeful practice, being injurious to the Trade at
large as well as to the parties immediately concerned, and
ought to be abolished" [ibid, p.272]. In 1823, Buddie complained to Pitt that Clayton had taken unilateral action in confirming the colliery's agents on the London market "as m u c h ...
for the purpose of personal friendship, as for benefiting the
Interests of the Colliery" [Bud/22, p118]. Given that Buddie had
previously written warmly of Clayton [ibid, p.97] it appears unlikely that this comment was generated by personal ill-will, but
was simply a reflection of the moral hazards inherent in the
industry's principal-agent relationships. In such circumstances,
Buddie's outstanding reputation within the coal industry and
his ability to inspire trust and confidence formed a valuable
element of the principal-agent relationship.
Transport: In the early eighteenth century, m i n i n g in
North-East England was concentrated in a limited area of the
u p p e r River Tyne and its s o u t h e r n tributaries, the Rivers
Derwent and Team [Flinn, 1984, p21]. This concentration was
due to geographical, geological and technological factors: coal
deposits could be worked in shallow mines sunk into steep valley sides that allowed the natural drainage of water, other practical means of drainage not being available. By the early eighteenth century these shallow mines were almost worked out,
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and the coal-field was gradually extended towards the high land
of the Tanfield area. Coal was plentiful in this area, but the
geography of the land did pose fundamental problems. A system of waggonways was necessary to transport coal to the
Tyne, but "the configuration of this hilly country is such that
these waggonways were inevitably channelled into the Derwent
valley, a bottleneck in which wayleaves (permission for transport) could be controlled relatively easily by a small n u m b e r of
landowners" [ibid, p.22]. A coal-owning partnership known as
the Grand Alliance operated in the North-East, and the Allies
often bought land and rented wayleaves "for the sole purpose of
denying t h e m to competitors" [ibid, p.41]. One Ally, Lord
Ravensworth, controlled wayleaves vital to the transport of
Tanfield Moor's coal and, in February 1827, Buddie [NRO, Bud/
22, pp.218-9] informed Pitt that the "increased....wayleave to
Lord Ravensworth and others is...a heavy tax upon us. This
...has cut down the profit of 1826 most cruelly." However
Buddie was willing to use his social standing to gain advantage
for Pitt, a reversal of the more usual situation whereby an agent
tried to generate social contacts and derive benefits from the
principal's higher status and w i d e r contacts [Cowton a n d
O'Shaughnessy, 1991, p.40]. In 1827, Buddie was included in
the social gatherings to celebrate the visit of the Duke of
Wellington to the North-East and took the opportunity to develop influential contacts. Thus, in October 1827, he was able to
write [NRO, Bud/22, p.235] to Pitt stating that:
I a m now on terms of intimacy...with Lord and Lady
Ravensworth...and don't despair of being able, by and
by, to induce his lsp. to relax a little in the amot. of
wayleave with which he has saddled us.
The monthly reports [NRO, Bud 37/1-6] provided summaries of actual wayleave and transport costs and, as part of his
management of these important areas, Buddie also prepared
detailed ad hoc costings [NRO, Bud/22, p.279] and cost estimates [NRO, Bud/22, pp.296; 301-3]. Transport costs and,
hence, colliery profitability were influenced tremendously by
technological development. An early instance had been the
change from transport by road to movement by "rail" transport
in which horses pulled coal wagons along wooden rails or
"waggonways" to the staithes, or loading points, on the River
Tyne. It had been estimated in 1711 that road transport from
Tanfield Moor to the Tyne resulted in a profit of £1.17.6 per
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol24/iss1/2

16

McLean: Agent's reputation, accounting and costing in organisational control structures
McLean: Agent's Reputation, Accounting and Costing in Organisational
Control Structures

17

"ten,", a standard unit of measurement, and that transport by
waggonway would increase profit to £5.5.9 per "ten" [Flinn,
1984, p. 149]. In Buddie's era, two significant developments in
transport technology were the development of railways and the
use of "spouts" at the staithes, enabling direct loading onto
colliers rather than via the intermediary of keel boats. In 1823
Buddie investigated the possibility of building a railway line to
the Tyne and prepared a detailed cost estimate [NRO, Bud/22,
p. 126] showing a total project cost of over £39,000. However,
this project was shelved, perhaps because of Pitt's lack of capital and the failure of negotiations with prospective partners
[Hiskey, 1978, p.72].
Buddie continued to use waggonways to transport Tanfield
Moor's coal until the early 1830s when the use of railways became a very real prospect. Buddie was the viewer for the
collieries of the Stanhope and Tyne Railway Company and was
involved in the calculation of the railway's quotation of 8s 3½d
per chaldron for leading the coals to the Tyne and shipping
them by spout. However, after receiving an offer from a rival
railway company, Buddie succeeded in renegotiating a price of
6s 3d per chaldron with the Stanhope and Tyne. "The new leading charge, free of fixed annual wayleaves...amounted to a 4/reduction per chaldron on the old leading costs" [ibid, p73].
Buddie [NRO, Bud/22, p.322] was in no doubt as to the importance of this arrangement, claiming that "it amounts to a renovation of the colliery, and will I trust enable it to live." Thus, in
his management of transport costs, Buddie was aided both by
the costing exercises he undertook at Tanfield Moor and by his
standing and influence in the coal industry.
Financial management: Buddie's continuing concern in financial management was to generate sufficient cash flow to
cover the colliery's wage bills and other operational payments
and to provide remittances to Pitt. However, it is probable that
the requirements of Buddie's monthly accounting system also
shaped Tanfield Moor's cash flows, particularly in relation to
wage bills. Although it was c o m m o n practice in the North-East
to pay colliery workers on a fortnightly basis, Buddie [NRO,
Bud/22, p.87] chose to introduce a variant to this system:
...28 days is named as the (accounting) period....because it its the custom to pay the colliers every 14 days;
but I only mean to pay the other classes of workmen
every 28 days. This will very m u c h simplify the Cash
Published by eGrove, 1997
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Acct. as I shall just have 12 monthly receipts of Mr
Clayton (the fitter) and 13 lunar payments in the year.
Buddie also cited the need to maintain the monthly preparation of accounts as being the key factor underlying his acceptance of Clayton's stance in the negotiation of the fitting charge.
He reported [ibid, p. 160] to Pitt
You will no doubt think this rather soft on my part, but
the fact is that I could not otherwise bring the matter
to a close with Mr C. and might have (negotiated) on
with him for the whole year which would have prevented me from Closing my Monthly Statements, in a
satisfactory manner.
Buddie regarded the timely preparation of monthly accounts as
a matter of some importance and aimed to have those accounts
in Pitt's hands in a matter of days after the month-end [ibid,
p. 153]. Thus, it is clear that Buddie considered that the monthly
accounts were a key element in the principal-agent reporting
relationship, as well as a necessary aid to his own cash flow
management of the colliery. In writing to Pitt, Buddie [ibid,
p.206] sometimes forecast cash flows several months ahead and
reported on his negotiations with Ridleys, the local bankers, to
obtain advances and overdrafts. However, Buddie's problems in
cash flow management were compounded by the nature of the
regional banking system. In 1826 he reported [ibid, p.206] to
Pitt:
I enclose a letter I have received this morning from our
Bankers. I called upon them yesterday to make arrangements for remitting...£1,200 ... when to my great
disappointment they told me it was not in their power
to fulfil their promise in consequence of want of public
confidence in their notes. A constant r u n continues
upon all our Banks and Ridleys are paying away 1000
sovereigns or Bank of England notes a day to take u p
their own notes, which are scarcely well out of the
Bank before they are bro t back again for gold....They
are afraid to pass their notes to their Customers to
make the Colliery pays, and we are all under the most
serious apprehension that we shall not long be able to
obtain a sufficient quantity of £1 notes to pay the
wages of the pitmen - as to obtaining (gold) sovereigns
for the purpose, that seems quite out of the question as
scarcely one is to be seen in circulation, altho' since the
beginning of December the Newcastle Bank has freed
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol24/iss1/2
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more than £200,000. The unfavourable state of affairs
is compelling the Bankers to call in all their advances...
the Commercial affairs of the county are getting into
the most embarrassing state imaginable and we are
menaced with the melancholy prospect of an almost
entire suspension of business.
In these difficult circumstances, Pitt may have been comforted by the knowledge that he had entrusted his affairs into
the hands of the industry's most outstanding and respected professional. Despite the vagaries of the banking system and the
coal mining industry, Tanfield Moor continued in business and
Buddie continued to emphasise short-term cash management in
order to meet the operational needs of the colliery and to remit
cash surpluses to the owner, although there does not appear to
have been any mechanism to set aside funds to meet the longterm capital development of the colliery, probably because such
expenditures were minimal and could be met out of current
cash flows.
Cash management may have been facilitated by the credit
terms available in the coal mining industry but credit arrangements may have accentuated the need for accrual accounting at
the year end. In 1824 Buddie [NRO, Bud/22, p. 176] noted that:
It is not customary in Colliery affairs to pay off tradesm e n within the Year in which the goods are obtained...
any Credit for Iron, Ropes and Prop. wood is 6 m o n t h s
but more frequently Twelve.
A possible implication of this particular letter is that, prior
to the engagement of Buddie, Tanfield Moor Colliery had not
been adopting the usual credit terms and, thus, Buddie's insistence on them may have helped to regulate cash flows. Furthermore, Buddie employed his extensive business and social network to preserve Pitt's cash resources from u n s c r u p u l o u s
taxation officials. Buddie [ibid, p. 161-2] wrote to Pitt that:
I happen to be intimate with the Surveyor General of
the Taxes in this District. I spent last evening with him
and asked him if any advantage would arise to you
from entering your Colliery establishment in Dorsetshire (Pitt's home area). He replied certainly not....I
told him that your surveyor was of the opinion that
some benefit would accrue from having the whole of
your establishment, Colliery and all, in one return. He
replied that the only person who could be benefited....
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would be the surveyor or collector himself whose per
centage would be increased by the augmentation of the
tax schedule.
Thus, in terms of financial management, Buddie brought
valuable knowledge, contacts and authority to bear in the pursuit of his principal's interests, in addition to implementing a
monthly accounting system that aided financial management
and reporting to the principal.
The annual accounts were employed little in the management of the colliery, but did keep the principal informed of
annual profit or loss: 1824 £6,374; 1825 £4,490; 1826 £3,747;
1827 £5,591; 1828 £2,934; [Flinn, 1984, p.321] 1829 £107; 1830
£1358; 1833 £774 (loss); [Hiskey, 1978, p.75]. The 1824 results
reflected Buddie's first year in complete effective control of
Tanfield Moor and Pitt expressed his thanks for Buddie's "extraordinary exertions" and his "real surprise" at the a m o u n t of
profit. The declining level of profits from 1829 onwards were
due largely to the marketing and pricing problems caused by
recession and the decline in the "Regulation of the Vend" [ibid,
p.75].
CONCLUSIONS
At Tanfield Moor, accounting systems were developed to
ensure regular, routine reporting by the agent to the principal
and to provide useful management information to the agent. As
agent, Buddie also prepared ad hoc costings to help h i m deal
with specific problems, for example in transportation. However,
where he judged operations to be satisfactory he did not employ
cost data. This non-use of cost data was probably a deliberate
choice on Buddie's part and is not indicative of any lack of
knowledge or ability in handling such data. Thus, the current
research does indicate that accounts were used as direct aids to
management at Tanfield Moor, and, taken in the context of the
well-established and widespread accounting and costing practices of the North-East England coal-field, does challenge
Fleischman and Parker's expectation that "nascent cost accounting would flourish more notably in a factory environment" [1991, p.363] than in extractive industries. The current
author's preliminary surveys of the Northumberland Record Office and the D u r h a m Record Office, and reading of the existing
literature [Flinn, 1984; Hatcher, 1993; Oldroyd, 1996] suggest
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that further research [e.g. Fleischman and Parker, forthcoming]
might overturn this expectation.
Principal-agent relationships were vital to organisational
control at Tanfield Moor, and the systems of accounting, costing and correspondence combined to keep the principal well
appraised of his agent's management of the colliery. However a
distinctive feature of the relationship between Buddie and Pitt
was the freedom the agent had to develop systems and take
managerial decisions that he thought were appropriate. There
is no evidence that Pitt ever used any of the available information to monitor Buddie in any way. At the heart of this relationship was Buddie's reputation and the authority of Buddie as an
expert and as a man. It has been argued [Otley, 1980] that
accounting is simply one feature in the control structure of an
organisation and that this control structure also includes features such as personnel selection. In the case of Tanfield Moor,
the appointment as agent of a m a n of Buddie's reputation lay at
the core of the control structure and was probably of greater
significance than the development of systems of accounting,
costing and correspondence.
The findings of the current research may be related to research undertaken on more recent control structures in coal
mining. After World War II, the British coal mining industry
was nationalised and a National Coal Board [NCB] was formed.
Berry et al [1985] conducted a study of an area of the NCB
during the early 1980s and found that although financial planning and control systems existed they were not the primary
form of organisational control. Production and technological
considerations were in the forefront and a set of cultural rather
than financial values pervaded the organisation, emphasising
the loyalty and support of managers for miners who did a difficult job in dangerous conditions. However, by the mid-1990s,
the privatisation program of the Conservative government had
ensured dismemberment of the nationalised industry and the
restoration of private ownership. A potential avenue for future
research might involve an examination of any changes in financial, organisational and cultural value systems consequent u p o n
the privatisation of the British coal-mining industry.
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